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2TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Immigrants in the European Union
Riva KASTORYANO1
Definitions of the European Union in terms of « shared destiny » or as an expression of the
« will to live together »2 ecall the inspirations that led to the formation of nation-states in
eighteenth century Europe. Can one think of the European Union in the same terms as nation-
states? Can nation-state building be a « model » for the construction of a political Europe? Can
the fact that European institutions are concerned to harmonize political, legal and cultural
differences impelling the states to attempt to set a common « political agenda »3 be enough to
conceive of the Union as a political community?4
Such thoughts raise two major questions in social sciences: the modes of political
participation in a united Europe and that of citizenship. According to article 8 of the
Maastricht Treaty, any individual who holds the nationality of a member state is a « citizen of
the Union ». This definition is merely the projection of citizenship in relation to nationality
worked out within the framework of nation-states. There is however a clash in practice.
According once again to the Maastricht Treaty, « citizens of the Union » are granted local
voting rights on the basis of residence. The separation between citizenship (legal rights in
practice) and nationality (belonging) has been introduced right from the start and leads to a
redefinition of the concept of ci izenship as extraterritorial. Seen from this perspective, the
practice of citizenship places the individual, the citizen of the Union, before multiple
                                         
1 Chargée de r cherche de CERI/ CNRS, Paris, France. Translated by Dominique Lussier (ISCA) and revised
by the author, from an original paper in Cultures et Conflits, no.28, Winter 1997, pp. 59-73
2 Quotations from Ernest R nan's lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882, in E. Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?
3 I borrow the sentence from Pierre Muller in 'Les mutations des politiques publiques européennes', Pouvoirs,
69-1994, p. 64.
3belongings and allegiances that indeed represent a challenge to the unitarian and territorial
nation-state.
Similarly, the territorial limits imposed on political action and citizenship confront
political participation at a transnational level. There are an important number of transnational
networks, formal and informal, some based on identity, others on interests, or often both as in
the case of « immigrants »5, i.e. residents or legally citizens of one member state according to
the legislation on citizenship but claiming the recognition of a different collective identity.
Despite the fact that immigration and integration policies come within the power of the States,
immigrants foster primordial solidarity networks which cross national borders on the grounds
of one or several identities, a so-called an « identity of origin » linking the home country to the
country of residence and to the broader European space. Such networks, like networks in
professional corporations, form the threads of a spider’s web covering European space, that
« space without internal frontiers » in which - according to the Single European Act of 1986 -
the free movement of goods, property and capital is safeguarded.
A transnational organization could allow the immigrant populations to bypass national
policies. Such an organization would be the expression of a quest for representation at the
European level and lead to recognition beyond nation-states. Its evolution underlines the
multiple interactions between national societies and the wider European space, between
national institutions and supranational institutions and among nation-state members of the
union together creating a common political involvement. These complex interactions lead to a
new concept of citizenship shared by the countries of origin, the country of residence and
                                                                                                                          
4 R.Kastoryano, Quelle identité pour l’Europe? Le Multiculturalisme à l’épreuve ; Paris Presses de Sciences-
Po. 1998 ; Cf also Esprit, Special issue on Europe : A political community ? March 1992.
5 The use of the word immigrant needs an explanatory note. By immigrant in this context is meant a population
who came and settled in different European countries in the 1960s mainly for economic reasons, even though in
many cases they came from former colonies. Juridically, the term refers to a temporary status, which is not
4Europe. The emergence of a transnational solidarity network among immigrants raises the
question of the link between participation and citizenship, nationality and identity, politics and
culture within both the nation-state and in the European Union.
Transnational networks, like the process of globalization in general, are an obvious
challenge to the nation state, but they do not lead necessarily to its erosion. They raise instead
the question of a redefinition of its political structure and of the balance between nation and
state, where the state is considered as the driving force behind the construction of global
structures and the nation as a resource for political action6. In fact transnational networks
increasingly appear as a crucial means of negotiating the claimed and represented identity and
interest ultimately with the state, while keeping the « idea of a nation » for mobilization7. By
the same logic, supranational institutions, by encouraging such structures, promote a
transnational public space, nd paradoxically reinforce the role of the state in the political
construction of Europe, and of the nation as a unit of identification.
Transnational solidarity and identities
All European countries have become de facto immigration countries, even if official discourse
in Germany rejects this reality. This has long been the case in France, since the 1960s for
Germany and Great Britain, and more recently in the case of Spain and Italy. A priori relations
of a historical and political kind between the countries of departure and the countries of arrival
                                                                                                                          
valid today. The use of the term reflects rather a social reality showing the difficulty of admitting these
populations to the social, cultural and political system.
6 My analysis will be based on the results of research that I conducted on Tra sna ional Solidarities in Europe
at the Centre d’Etudes et de R cherches Internationales (CERI) in Paris (1992-1994). Financed by the French
Ministry of Research, the research consisted in finding voluntary associations involved in building a
transnational network at European level and interviewing their leaders. The results have been published in
Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, ( pecial issue on « Mobilisations ethniques : Du national au
transnational », vol.10, no.1, 1994. I thank C. Neveu and M. Diop for having participated actively in the field
work as well as in the final analysis.
7 D.Lapeyronnie, « Nation, démocratie et identités en Europe » in R.Kastoryano (ed.), Quelle identité pour
l’Europe ? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve ; Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1998.
5have determined patterns of destination and settlement inside different member states of the
Union for the various populations from the southern or eastern Mediterranean, Africa, or the
Indian subcontinent8.
Each country is trying to advance the specificity of its own position, drawn from the
founding principles of the nation state, in order to emphasize its distinctive attitude towards
immigration and the presence of immigrant populations9. In this perspective, the French model
is the exemplar of the nation state based on the premises of republican individualism, implying
the assimilation of individuals who have become citizens by choice. The French model is
usually contrasted with the German one: the former operates on the basis of an elective and
political concept of the nation while the latter derives from cultural and ethnic criteria which
favor common ancestry. As for the so-called Anglo-Saxon model, it is distinguished from the
French model by granting recognition to the cultural, national and religious communities in
public life.
These particularities of natio al rhetorics are echoed in the manifestations of the
collective identities on which immigrant populations base their political claims. Indeed, the fact
that their requests are in most cases shaped by reaction to national representation as well as to
public policies on behalf of immigration or integration, leads immigrants to define a core
identity around which a community can be constructed in order to negotiate its recognition
with the state10. In France for example, the republican rhetoric on citizenship and a defensive
discourse of secularism « laïcité » have led immigrants to claim recognition as a religious
                                         
8 France receives the majority of North Africans (820 000 Algerians; 516 000 Moroccans; 200 000 Tunisians),
and Germany receives the greater number of Turks (1 700 000). Turks (160 000) and Moroccans (123 000)
form the major part of the extra-European communities present in the Netherlands, while Great Britain stands
out with its large number of populations of Indian origin (689 000), West Indian (547 000) and Pakistani (406
000); Sources SOPEMI-OCDE, Eurostat, INED.
9 Cf. W.R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Ca bridge MASS., Harvard
University Press. 1992; L. Dumont, L'idéologie allemande. France-Allemagne et retour, Paris, Gallimard,
1991.
6community within state legitimacy. In Germany by contrast, the ethnic understanding of the
nation impels foreigners towards an ethnic community, or even an ethnic minority based on a
common «foreign » nationality. This process is very evident among Turks who claim dual
citizenship status, where citizenship is expressed in terms of rights and nationality in terms of
an ethnic identity11. Where ethnicity becomes synonymous with nationality, as in Great Britain,
ethnic communities may find common ground in fostering a « Black » identity as part of the
struggle against racism, while also recalling the racial character of the cleavage in Great
Britain.
But on the European level, discourses try to demarcate national particularities in
reaction to each other. In France, for instance, the so-called immigrants’ associations are
opposed to all forms of intervention in the name of « ethnicity », a term used in the British
context. The discourses of militants or activists refer to the state’s concerns with social
exclusion. There is, however, a simultaneous convergence of various European countries’
strategies and modes of political participation regarding the political action of the political
actors born of immigration. Whether states proclaim themselves to be republican and
« assimilationist » as in France, or else favour the formation of ethnic communities as in Great
Britain or is perceived as « exclusionary » in matters of citizenship as in Germany, in all these
countries strategies of immigrants for integration are becoming increasingly collective, giving
priority to cultural belonging, in interaction with the respective national and/or local
institutions.
For the most part, this results from a convergence among European countries with
regard to policies on immigration and integration, even though the understanding of
« integration » varies from one country to another. Policies converged also for the
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7« management » of collective identities emerging in the public arena. Inspired by a certain
brand of liberalism in matters of identity, European states are relying on democracy as a
method, so as to define specific political measures in order to integrate « differences » in the
national community.
These parallel convergences meet in a European space that constitutes a new political
arena. In effect, the European Union brings together the actions both of the nation states and
of the political actors of immigration which strive to remain independent from the national
« models ». « Immigrant or young generation born of immigration » in France, « foreigners » in
Germany, or else « thnic communities » in Great Britain - depending on the terminology
prevailing in each country - find refuge in transnational solidarity networks based on
nationality, religion or both, and always in terms of interests. Even though immigration and
integration policies always fall within the province of the nation states, they seek an anchor
point in the new political space called Europe, with its undetermined identity, in opposition to
nation-states’ identities anchored in history. This became especially clear at the time the
Maastricht Treaty was signed, when some spoke of a « thirteenth population » or « thirteenth
State », or even a « thirteenth nation », thus making obvious the will to overcome European
national frameworks in order to draw attention to a tra snational community as a new
structure.
Transnational communities are one of the consequences of the increasing mobility of
immigrants between their home and host countries. They have become a way of expressing
political and economic participation in both spaces. Studies of the emergence of such
communities emphasize the post-colonial immigration and the individual, commercial,
institutional (political, cultural and social) relations that immigrants entertain in the two
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8countries. Operating in two countries gives rise to new practices and symbols12. In most cases
transnational communities are built on common geographical, cultural and political references,
hence their relative homogeneity as well as the intensity of intra-communal relations and the
efficiency in their action.
In the context of the European Union, a transn tional community transcends member
states’ boundaries. Some of the networks which foster such a cross border view are born of
local initiatives, while some are set in place by European Union institutions, the European
Parliament in particular; others are promoted by the countries of origin. However, all assist the
activists in working out strategies that reach beyond state systems. As a leader of such an
association in Marseilles puts it: « One must make habits, one must address supranational
organizations, reach one organization in Strasbourg, in Brussels, a European organization
which will have to set down the law. »
Migrants’Forum and Citizenship Identity
The purpose of European institutions is to find a common denominator to deal with claims at a
level beyond relations with the nation states. Thus, since 1986, the European Parliament has
given subsidies to « immigrants’ associations » to help them coordinate their actions, to extract
them from both their home and host country’s politics and integrate them into the European
Union. A new transnational structure called the Migrants' Forum has arisen from such
                                         
12cf. Basch L., Schiller N.G., Blanc C.S., Nations Unbound. Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments
and Deterritorialized Nation-States. ; Gordon Breach  Publishers 1997 (4th )
Cohen R., Global Diasporas. An Introduction, U iversity of Washington Press, Seattle 1997 ; Gupta A.,
Ferguson J., (eds.) Culture, Power, Place. Durham, Duke Unversity Press, 1997 ; Hannerz U., Transnational
Connections. Culture, People, Places. London, Routledge 1996 ; A. Portes, « Transnational Communities :
Their Emergence and Significance in the Contemporary World System », inR.P.Korzeniewicz and W.C.Smith
(eds.) Latin America in the World Economy; Greenwood Press ; P. Levitt, « Local-level Global religion : The
Case of U.S.-Dominican Migration », i  Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1998, (37)1, pp. 74-89 ;
« Transnationalizing Community Development : Th  Case of Migration Between Boston and the Dominican
Republic » in Nonprofit and Voluntary sector Quarterly, vol.26, no.4, December 1997, pp. 509-526.
9undertakings. Even though, according to the person in charge of immigration-related issues in
the Commission, the Forum owes its creation to the Union’s budgetary policy, it nevertheless
aims to be « a place where the populations settled in Europe who do not form communities can
express their concerns and voice their requests, and also diffuse the information arising from
European proceedings »13. The goal would be to obtain for the nationals of third countries
« the same opportunities and the same rights as those of citizens, so as to compensate for the
democratic deficit ». Explicitly, therefore, the aim is to legally counter the rise of racism across
the different European countries. Consequently, these are essentially associations whose
activities are backed up by the member states, and whose leaders work out a discourse on the
equality of rights, on the universality of human rights, and who see in transnational
mobilization one effective means of fighting against racism and xenophobia14.
In principle, the Migrants’ Forum gathers together the immigrants' associations formed
according to the nationality criterion. But other selective criteria can determine which
associations may join the Forum : q alifications for rganization, gauged in terms of the
number of nationalities being represented, the number of branches, the scale of the networks,
the plurality of sectors they combine (economic, social, cultural) and of course their
representation in the country where they are based.
In reality, the main criterion for network structuring relates to identity. Presumed
identities of origin, or « circumstantial » identities, to quote Jean L ca’s term, construed in
relation with the host States and institutionalized by the associations, form links in the
transborder chain. This is confirmed by the local actions of some associations, since they will in
                                         
13 C. Neveu, 'Citoyenneté ou racisme en Europe: exception et complémentarité britanniques', Revue
Européenne des Migrations Internationales, vol. 10, no 1, 1994, pp. 95-109.
14 In 1990, 29% of the individuals who were consulted wanted to see some restrictions on the rights of
immigrants. In 1992, this reached 34%. Similarly in 1991, 60% would have agreed to the arrival of immigrants
from the Mediterranean provided restrictions were imposed on them, and in 1993, only 46% of public opinion
showed approval. Eurobaromètre, December 1992.
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the future include programs for cultural exchanges, concerts and debates across Europe, so as
to define their social and legal position within the Union. The avowed aim of European
institutions compel them, as a matter of fact, to conceal their concerns with identity when they
strive towards recognition in their capacity as « non-European Europeans ».
This is precisely the paradox of supranationality. In effect, European institutions, by
definition, form a challenge to the nation states. With the creation of the Migrants’ Forum, the
European Parliament signals its autonomy with regard to national institutions and induces
political actors derived from immigration to situate themselves beyond the nation states. But
simultaneously, by defining the criteria for admission into the Migrants' Forum in the very
terms applying to the welfare states of the member countries, the European Parliament casts
the images of collective identities at the European level. Behind the criteria of nationality which
is considered to be a juridical one, and therefore objective, voluntary associations who are part
of the Forum express a « n tionality of origin », or a religion (mainly Islam) related to it, or
colour. Therefore it is not a matter of nationality: it is a matter of ethnicity defined as a
subjective feeling of belonging and to some extent, of membership15.
From this perspective, the European space appears as the projection of the nation-state
at the transnational level. But already at the national level the fight against racism is becoming
increasingly linked with the assertion of a collective identity confronting social problems,
perceived and lived at the same time on the basis of a community of origins and the rise of an
« ethnicity » resting on the foundations of identity.
In this light, a united Europe and an emerging transnational community form a second
stage for political socialization for political actors, immigrants and nationals, the first being that
which operates within national social frameworks. In effect, since the 1980s, with the
                                         
15 cf. M.Weber in Economy and Society, vol.1, University of California Press, p.395
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proliferation of the so-called immigrants’ associations created and sustained by the public
authorities, religious, national, and ethnic identities have come to the fore to confront the state
with a view towards recognition.
At the same time, participation built up within the voluntary associations and the
national institutions whereby « civic virtue » is acquired, signals the dawning of the very
exercise of citizenship, and more importantly the creation of a « citizen identity ». Such
participation finds expression in both so-called community and national institutions, and above
all, it displays the level of involvement of the individual16. After l, this is the result of a
« political acculturation » process, to quote Habermas, i.e. the internalization of the national
values of the host countries and of the rules of the political game.
The very concepts of citizenship and nationality are defined above all as the individual’s
belonging to a political community. A « citizen identity » mainly derives from participation, be
it direct or indirect, in the public life of immigrants and of the bulk of the population. Of
course, the laws on nationality and citizenship affect modes of participation and actors’
strategies. For example, legally-defined citizenship leads immigrant youths in France to direct
involvement in the political community through voting. In Germany, where the laws on
nationality and citizenship give precedence to affiliation over birth on national soil,
« foreigners » develop compensating strategies through indirect means of participation, driving
them to find means by which to influence public opinion. Through the associations, they are
integrated into German corporatism and therefore into civil society. This kind of citizenship
could well be labeled a civil citizenship in contrast to a civic one. Thus immigrants, citizens or
foreigners from a legal viewpoint, are driven to action in the public sphere, defined as a
                                         
16 For citizenship as feeling of belonging and citizenship as involvement, see Jean Leca «Individualisme et
citoyenneté » in Pierre Birnbaum, Jean Leca (dir.), Sur l'individualisme, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1986, pp.
159-213.
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common arena for s cialization and the exercise of power. In this way they are in a position to
display their involvement in and their belonging to (at least de facto) the national community.
Such a definition of citizenship goes against the grain of classical analyses of citizenship
linked in systematic fashion to the framework of the nation state, where identity and politics
are confounded. The various levels of belonging and political involvement show that, in
practice, citizenship is severed from a conception exclusively linked to national identity. No
matter whether citizenship is political, legal, social or economic, its content based on identity,
culture or legal notions, this arrangement boils down to a feeling of loyalty aimed
simultaneously towards the group, the community, the civil society and the state.
Thus social reality tends to upset the convergence of the national community nd the
political community, the connection between identity and law, as well as the connection
between culture and politics. Therefore, citizenship is increasingly restricted to a right to civic
participation and no longer excludes, albeit in theory, the manifestation of collective identities,
even though this questions French republican ideology. However, in spite of the different
political traditions which favor participation within the republican political community in
France, while in Germany aims at participation in civil society, we are dealing in both cases
with the cooptation of a concept of citizenship which has been strictly restricted to the nation
state. Therefore, there is a dissociation between citizenship and nationality which reduces the
former to political rights and grants the latter its own dimension with respect to identity. The
multiple identifications and cultural, ethnic, or religious allegiances that derive from it lead to
new definitions of belonging which are now labeled «postnational », in reference to a political
Europe.
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An extraterritorial citizenship and identity 
With the transnational solidarity networks, a new practice of political participation enters in a
united Europe as in the nation states. Through it, the non-national actors, nevertheless
European residents, assert their autonomy with respect to the state systems defined on a
territorial basis. By claiming equality of rights and of treatment, they are striving to promote
their status as « European citizen s» in the newly shaped political arena.
Many debates on citizenship, nationality and European identity have taken place
alongside the progressive transformation of a large single market into a political arena. Jean-
Marc Ferry suggests a « postnational » model in order to underline the taking over of the
« nationalist principle » fostered by the building of a political Europe17. Habermas, for his part,
develops the concept of « constitutional patriotism » in order to emphasize the separation
between the feeling of belonging that national citizenship involves and its legal practice beyond
the framework of the nation state18. T king into account the non-European populations
deriving from immigration in the 1960s, Yasemin Soysal defines as « postnational » the
fostering of international norms referring to the person or residence instead of legal
citizenship19.
The postnational approach to belonging feeds the normative discourses that deal with
the required definition for a new citizenship model. However, European projects do not always
follow the same direction as these discourses. From a legal viewpoint, the Maastricht Tr aty
maintains the link between national citizenship and « cit zenship of the Union ». The citizen of
the Union has the right to move and remain freely inside the territory of the member countries;
                                         
17 Jean-Marc Ferry, «Pertinence du postnational », Esprit, November 1991, pp. 80-94. Cf. also J-M. Ferry,
« L’Etat européen » in R.Kastoryano (ed.) Quelle identité pour l’Europe ? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve.
Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1998, pp.169-230.
18 J.Habermas, « Citoyenneté et identité nationale » in Jacques Lenoble et Nicole D wanre (eds.), L'Europe au
soir des siècles, Paris, Seuil, coll. Esprit, 1992, pp. 17-39.
19 Yasemin N.Soysal, Limits of Citizenship ; Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1994.
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furthermore s/he has the right to vote in municipal and European elections in a member state
where s/he is not a national but a mere resident. This practice introduces in reality a notion of
extraterritoriality of citizenship, and questions the adaptability of national citizenship to
European legal frameworks.
As to the political involvement of the activists among immigrants towards equality of
rights at both the national and European levels, it is accompanied by a new language they have
introduced concerning citizenship. « We are European citizens; we are part of the European
landscape », says one association spokesman. As far as they are concerned, the European
landscape is no more than this spider’s web, made of solidarity and interest networks, and
spreading throughout a territory now including fifteen countries that constitutes a space of
political participation beyond nation-state, but at the same time paradoxically a political space
in interaction with nation states. As they see it, their presence in that web as a transnational
community defined by a common fight against racism confers on them a « right » o participate
in the building of Europe on the basis of their commitment towards a new political space that
would give everyone the status of citizen of the Union, and based on their status of a European
resident settled in a member country for almost thirty years in many cases.
The structuring of transnational networks suggests an identification with European
society. For non-nationals resident in any of the member countries, citizenship then involves
taking responsibility for the formation of the new « shar d destiny » and the construction of a
new « community of faith ».
A transnational participation and a European political identification leads to a confusion
in the definition of legal status with regard to the couple citizenship / nationality. The
associations’ members who say they are European residents nevertheless experience difficulties
in defining what would be the right kind of status for them. «We ar  somehow Europeans,
citizens of Europe. If we are not European citizens we nonetheless see ourselves as citizens of
15
Europe », says an association leader, adding: « As to acquiring nationality, as far as we are
concerned, we would have preferred a European nationality with regard to free movement».
While nationality conceived of in the nation state framework is an identity and a bearer of de
jure citizenship, in the words of this activist nationality assumes a legal significance inasmuch
as access to Union citizenship should also imply the right of free movement. Such confusion is
significant; infused with the nation-state model of citizenship and nationality it addresses a
distinction between rights and identity. But it also underlines the complexity of the reality and
creates a paradox in the analysis. By stimulating their involvement in the « commo  good »
that represents the European Union for them, supranational institutions extract immigrants
from their «primordial ties », take them away from any direct political action towards their
home country and bring them into a common identification defined by a common European
interest. But paradoxically enough, European citizenship as a more global concept of
membership than nation-states introduces the allegiance of immigrants to their home country
into the bargaining process in the same way they express their allegiance to their state of
residence and to the transnational community in which they are involved.
Thus the discourses on political Europe and its consequences keep piling up, either
resembling or contradicting each other. Their polysemous character brings to the fore the
disruption of the nation state « model » as well as the difficulty of parting with it. On the other
hand, a « postnational » citizenship is far from appearing on the horizon, suggesting its
incompatibility with European realities. Europe is being built with supranational institutions
instead, the idea and functioning of which are opposed to the « postnational » concept. While
the latter would lead to a recognition of cultural diversity and acceptance of pluralism as the
basis for European belonging, the supranational approach in the construction of a unified
European space appears like a projection of the nation state and is being imposed upon the
16
states. Furthermore, while questioning the nation state, it reinforces the role of the state in the
building of a political Europe.
« Bringing the State Back in »20
The consolidation of transnational solid rities generally aims to influence the state from the
outside. Even though transnational networks contribute in some respects to the formation of
« exclusive communities » out of their relations with the state, the latter from now on appear
as indispensable structures for negotiating with public authorities the recognition of collective
identities constructed and shaped within frameworks that remain national. In effect, the
objective of such a tr nsborder structure for voluntary associations is to reinforce their
representation at the European level, but its practical goal is ultimately to gain « recogni ion »
at the national level. Shall we add that the activists, even those most active at the European
level, ultimately see the states as their only « adversary»? Besides, the states’ predominance
can be felt in the problems the associations have in coordinating their actions and their claims
when they spring from their own initiative.
In other words, the aim is to reach a political representation that can only be defined at
the national level, in order to protect rights of residence, to housing and employment, linked
with the reckoning of this identity. Thus all claims at a national level from now on imply
parallel pressure at the European level. But conversely, all claims at the European level aim to
have an impact on decisions taken at the national level within each of the member countries:
« For us, immigrants from third countries, we must act in such a way as to be in an effective
position to get organized and protect ourselves, to carry our claims high; since the bulk of our
recommendations which are backed up by the EEC and often favorable to us are not always
17
seen in the best of light by the member countries ... Let us act in such a way that what is
positive at the European level be echoed in the country » (quoting from a leader of the Union
of African Workers in France).
Thus a united Europe introduces a « normative supranationalism »21 outdoing the
nation states' framework, and even imposed upon the states. In cases of expulsion, for
example, the foreigner can oppose national decisions by invoking the right to respect for family
life (article. 8 ¶ 1), once the internal modes of appeal have been exhausted. Even though
human rights remain the exclusive province of the States, the latter are forced to accept the
new legal norms produced by the European institutions, inasmuch as the European Convention
for Human Rights authorizes the European citizen (in this case one having the nationality of a
member State that recognizes individual appeal) to address the Council of Europe directly, and
a foreigner (who does not hold the nationality of a member country of the Union) to appeal to
the European Court for Human Rights.
Another example is given by « solidarity rights »22, referring to the freedom of
collective action in the community framework and asserting that « it s only within the
community that the full blossoming of the individual personality becomes possible »23, that
could lead back to « minority » rights in the case of immigrant populations. According to the
European Convention for Human Rights, « the word minority refers to a group inferior in
number to the rest of the population and whose members share in their will to hold on to their
culture, traditions, religion or language »24.
                                                                                                                          
20 In English in the original (translator's note). From P.B.Evans, D.Rueschemeyer & T.Skocpol (eds.), Bringing
the State Back In; Cambridge University Press, 1985;
21 B. de Witte, « The European Community and its Minorities » in Breman et al.(eds.) Peoples and Minorities
in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1993, pp.167-185
22 F.Sudre, Droit international et européen des droits de l’homme, Paris, PUF, 1997, pp.153-158
23 Article 29, ¶ 1 of the Declaration quoted by F.Sudre,op.cit., p.154.
24 Article 2 of the proposition for the convention of 1991, quoted by F.Sudre, op.cit. 1997, p.154.
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This concept, laden with ideology, provokes varying reactions from one country to the
next. In France, where regional or religious identities are concerned, or else collective identities
evident with populations born of immigration, the term is being rejected. In Germany, it refers
to German minorities only, settled outside German territory. In any case, Turkish nationals in
particular draw inspiration from the official usage of the term when they demonstrate the desire
to structure a Turkish or Kurdish national community in Germany. The rearranging of their
associations along these lines drives the Federal Republic to react in similar terms.
Thus supranationality which increases interaction between countries gives rise to a
resistance to European unification underlying the predominance of national particularities in its
construction, all the more so when dealing with policies regarding immigration, integration and
access to citizenship. The remarks of Charles Pasqua, the then French Minister of the Interior,
during the debates on new measures concerning the nationality law, identity checks and
immigration, are quite revealing in this light: « In order to keep its identity under control,
France intends to define her position herself, the quality and origins of those who are or will be
associated with the national community in the spirit of the values of her Republic, in the
framework of its Constitution and in the respect of international law to which she freely gave
her consent »25.
On the other side of the Rhine, in Germany, article 16 of the Fundamental Law
concerning asylum seekers similarly became a hot topic in the early 1990s. The debates on the
abolition of this article yielded remarks akin to those of the former French Minister of the
Interior: «It concerns the right of peoples to self-determination, a right which has precedence
over the right to remain. This right to self-determination derives from the sovereignty of the
                                         
25 Le Monde, 17 June 1993, p. 7. Debates about and changes oi immigration policies and citizenship laws since
1993 have all emphasized French Republican particularities for either a more restrictive or more generous
approaches. See debates in 1995 with M.Debré, and more recently the report by P. Weil on Immigration and
citizenship laws published by La Documentation Française, Paris, 1997.
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State; it means independence from all form of foreign authority, the power to decide on the
course of the political, economic, social and cultural evolution of one’s own country »26.
Finally, the two countries develop arguments that are dictated by their own conception
of « evil », born of the presence of foreigners: France fears the non-identification of the French
of foreign origins with the national community; Germany suspects abuses of the right to remain
on the part of asylum seekers, to which must be added xenophobic sentiments which seek
justification in the economic crisis affecting all European countries. In all, this « evil » that
came from elsewhere leads to assertions of « a right to self-determination » which paraphrases
in one way, inside Europe, the same right as applied to minorities or oppressed peoples. Such
evolution increases the already existing tensions between immigrant populations, majority
populations and the states.
The European Union stands for the ideal of open-minded conciliation, for an alternative
conception of universality than that of the nation states, and it is perceived as peculiar.
According to those who fight on behalf of immigration, the idea of universality suitable for
Europe would be to conceive of an arena in which foreigners resident in Europe, and even
citizens who are perceived to be foreigners (by virtue of the nationality of origins seen as an
ethnic marker, or by virtue of col r or religion) would be inscribed within a plurality of
cultures for the same reason as those referring to traditional national identities. To imagine a
« transnational community » born of immigration would give support to nationalist sentiments
voiced by the member states facing immigration on the one hand and the building of Europe on
the other hand. But at the same time, the irrationality of national sentiments amounting to no
more than ethnic belonging stands opposed to the rationality of the European institutions
                                         
26 Extract from the Bulletin d'I formation sur le droit d'asile, du Centre d'Information et de Documentation de
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which, anxious to harmonize political norms, define legal norms in such areas, Human Rights
and the right of minorities in particular, areas that concern the « internal foreigners ».
To structure a transnational network represents a Europeanizing of the political action
of immigrant populations sustained by supranational institutions, but it does not bring about
the Europeanization of claims. These remain attached to the states as the only practical frame
for mobilization and negotiation, as well as a legal and institutional frame for recognition.
Obviously a transnational community which crosses national borders highlights the principle of
multiple identifications deriving from the very logic of a political Europe. This principle is
precisely what provokes the passionate debates accompanying its construction, for it disrupts
the concept of citizenship linked to nationality and political identity, and to the territorial
nature of participation as well. It signals therefore the weakening of the nation states facing
identity claims being expressed within national borders.
But the non-relevance of the nation state in a political Europe does not necessarily
imply its erosion. The construction of a political Europe following the model of nation-state
building raises the question of the gap between « a model » and its application in another
political and cultural context. Empirical evidence shows that states remain the « driving force »
of the European Union. Even though they are submitted to supranational norms, states keep
their autonomy in internal decisions, and in international relations they are the main actors. As
far as the nation is concerned its relevance stems from the fact that it remains the emotional
unit for identification, mobilization and resistance. The nation is at the basis of any
transnational enterprise. Therefore the permanence of the nation-state as a model for a political
                                                                                                                          
l'Ambassade de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne, June 1993.
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unit in the construction of Europe relies very much on its capacity « o negot ate » within and
without, that is its capacity to adopt structural and institutional changes to the new reality27.
                                         
27 Cf.R.Kastoryano, p.cit. 1997
